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Enforcement of Labor Arbitration Agreements:
Is Refusal to Arbitrate an Unfair
Labor Practice?
The majority of collective bargaining contracts today contain
a series of provisions designed to settle grievances; in most
instances the last step is submission of the dispute to arbitration.'
Once the arbitration procedure has been invoked there are com-
paratively few instances of refusals to abide by the arbitrator's
award.2 The problem does arise, however, as to what remedy is
available if one party refuses to submit the issue to arbitration
as agreed in the contract. The executory agreement to arbitrate
is unenforceable at common law.8 Hence it is necessary for
parties to the collective bargaining contract to find some other
means of enforcing their agreement. Four possible methods of
enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate exist at present and
will be discussed here.
Since the legislatures of some states have passed statutes
authorizing the courts to enforce agreements to arbitrate4 the
first avenue of attempting enforcement is through the state
courts. Generally, however, the results obtained by the use of
these statutes have not been satisfactory in labor cases because
the acts were not made specifically to be applied to labor arbi-
tration agreements. 5 In fact, most of the statutes contain clauses
1. In 1950 the United States Department of Labor reported that a com-
prehensive study of representative collective bargaining agreements showed
that 80 percent provided for some type of arbitration. Arbitration Provisions
in Union Agreements in 1949, 70 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 160 (1950).
2. "In only 51 of 16,819 arbitrations-0.3 per cent-in which the respon-
dents participated in the prior two-year period did either party refuse to
accept the award." Warren & Bernstein, A Profile of Labor Arbitration, 4
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 200, 217 (1951).
3. The courts today enforce an executed agreement to arbitrate. This
means that if the arbitrator has already rendered his award the court will
force the parties to abide by it. The only time a court will refuse to do so
is when they believe that: (1) the arbitrator has exceeded his jurisdiction, or,
(2) there was a lack of due process in the proceedings. But cf. Western Union
Tel. Co. v. American Communications Ass'n, CIO, 299 N.Y. 177, 86 N.E.2d 162
(1949).
4. See notes 6-13 infra.
5. Some states have obtained desirable results as in New York. N.Y.
CIVIL PRACTICE ACT §§ 1448-1469 provide for specific performance of contracts
to arbitrate in labor disputes and the New York courts have so applied it.
Local 474, National Food Chain Store Employees, C.I.O. v. Safeway Stores
Inc., 79 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1948). See also Nordlinger, The Law and
Practice of Arbitration in New York, 13 Mo. L. RE.v, 196 (1948),
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excluding "contracts for personal services,"6 "contracts pertaining
to labor,"7 "contracts of employment and labor,"' and the like.
Such exclusionary clauses have given the courts a basis on which
to refuse to enforce the labor management agreementY The
Louisiana Arbitration Law' contains such an exclusionary clause,
stating that:
"Nothing contained in this Chapter shall apply to contracts
of employment of labor or to contracts for arbitration which
are controlled by valid legislation of the United States....
Although the Louisiana courts have never passed on the point,
it is at least arguable that the exception provision will be inter-
preted to exclude collective bargaining agreements. 12 Some stat-
utes contain provisions which are even more explicit, such as the
Ohio statute reading: "The provisions of this act shall not apply
to (a) collective or individual contracts between employers and
employees in respect to terms or conditions of employment.' 13
(Italics supplied.) In these cases the courts seem justified in
refusing to apply the statutes to collective bargaining contracts.14
A second possible method of enforcement of the agreement
to arbitrate is the use of the Federal Arbitration Act.15 By this
act the federal courts are given jurisdiction over certain arbitra-
tion disputes. Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act gives the
courts the power to stay proceedings where arbitration has been
agreed upon and Section 4 empowers the courts to compel arbi-
tration. However, a difficulty similar to that found in the appli-
cation of state statutes is encountered. Thus, Section 1, which
defines maritime transactions and commerce, provides: ".
nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment
of seamen, railroad workers, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." If a collective bar-
gaining contract is a "contract of employment" within the mean-
6. Pa. Laws 1927, No. 248, p. 381.
7. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1280 (Deering, 1949).
8. LA. R.S. § 9:4216 (1950).
9. California has said that the exclusionary clause in its statute did not
exclude collective bargaining agreements, but was meant to prohibit involun-
tary servitude. Levy v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.2d 692, 104 P.2d 770 (1940).
Pennsylvania courts seem split on the question.
10. LA. R.S. § 9:4201 et seq. (1950).
11. LA. R.S. § 9:4216 (1950). See also the provisions for voluntary arbi-
tration of labor disputes contained in LA. R.S. §§ 23:872-875 (1950).
12. See note 20 infra.
13. OHIo GEN. CODE § 12148-1 (Page, 1938).
14. As was done in Utility Workers' Union v. Ohio Power Co., 36 Ohio 0.
324 (C.P. 1947).
15. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1946).
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ing of this section, then of course the Federal Arbitration Act
cannot be used to enforce the agreement to arbitrate in labor
cases. While the Supreme Court has never passed on this point
and the circuit and district courts are in disagreement,, the courts
have almost unanimously refused to grant specific performance
to parties attempting a direct enforcement of the arbitration
clause. 16 A few courts have recognized the agreement as an
affirmative defense and issued a stay of proceedings under Sec-
tion 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act without going further. 7
A third available method is the use of Section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act which gives the federal courts
16. In J. I. Case v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944), the Supreme Court said
that a collective bargaining agreement was not a "contract of employment,"
but rather a "trade agreement." This case, however, did not concern the
Federal Arbitration Act.
The circuit courts line up as follows. The Second, Fourth, Sixth and
Tenth Circuits all seem to be of the opinion that the Federal Arbitration Act
does not apply to collective bargaining agreements. An example of the con-
fusing situation existing in these courts is given by the Third Circuit's hold-
ings. This court originally held that a collective bargaining agreement was
not a "contract of employment." Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co.,
138 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1943). Later, however, the court reversed itself and held
just the opposite. Amalgamated Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,
Inc., 192 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1951). In a very recent case, however, the Third
Circuit, while standing by its decision in the Pennsylvania Greyhound case
that a collective bargaining agreement is a "contract of employment," applied
the Federal Arbitration Act to a collective bargaining agreement. This was
accomplished by giving the phrase "workers engaged in interstate com-
merce" a very narrow construction and hence excluding the workers in this
case from the exemption of the act. Tenney (Engineering), Inc. v. United
Electrical, Radio & Machinists Workers of America, Local 437, 207 F.2d 450
(3d Cir. 1953). Note the dissent by McLaughlin, J., id. at 455. Mr. Cox, in
discussing the Tenney case sums up the problem as follows: "The latter
point [whether or not a collective bargaining agreement is a contract of
employment of a class of workers engaged in interstate commerce] involves
three related questions: (1) Does the concluding clause of Section 1 create
an exception to the entire Arbitration Act rather than to only those sections,
not including Section 3, whose application depends upon a showing that the
promise to arbitrate is written in a 'maritime transaction' or a 'contract
evidencing a transaction Involving interstate commerce'? (2) Is a collective
bargaining agreement a 'contract of employment'? (3) Are the employees
covered by the agreement 'a class of workers engaged in foreign or inter-
state commerce'? A negative answer to any one of these three questions
would lead to granting the motion for a stay in any action brought under
LMRA Section 301 to recover damages upon an issue covered by a contract
grievance procedure ending in arbitration. All three questions were raised
In the Tenney case upon rather confusing precedents." Cox, Grievance Arbi-
tration in the Federal Courts, 67 HARv. L. REV. 591, 593 (1954). As was seen,
the Tenney case seems to have applied the Federal Arbitration Act by giving
a negative answer to Mr. Cox's third question. The most liberal district
court decision is United Office Workers v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 88 F.
Supp. 602 (E.D. Pa. 1950). In this case the court not only issued a stay of
proceedings, but also directed the employer to proceed with arbitration. In
doing this the court used Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act.
17. See also Gregory & Orlikoff, The Enforcement of Labor Arbitration
Agreements, 17 U. of Cm. L. REv. 233, 257 et seq. (1950); Comment, 12 Louisi-
ANA LAW Rvisw 462 (1952).
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jurisdiction over a breach of a collective bargaining contract. The
agreement to arbitrate may come before the court in one of two
ways. The defendant in the suit for breach of contract may use
the agreement as an affirmative defense against a suit for breach
of contract, asking that the court stay proceedings until arbitra-
tion has been completed; or the plaintiff may seek specific per-
formance of the agreement to arbitrate. Here again the courts
have been reluctant to enforce the agreement to arbitrate.18
Several recent cases, however, may indicate some change in this
attitude.
In Milk and Ice Cream Drivers' Union, Local 98 v. Gillespie
Milk Products Corp.'9 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit issued an injunction directing the employer to abide by
an arbitration award under Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act. While it is true that in this case there was an
executed arbitration, the fact that the court used Section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act in reaching the result is
significant.
The case of Textile Workers' Union of America v. American
Thread Co.20 arose from an employer's refusal to arbitrate a
grievance as agreed in the contract. The union sought and the
district court granted specific performance of the agreement.
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act was again
employed by the court as the basis for its jurisdiction. Whether
the court considered the Labor Management Relations Act, the
Federal Arbitration Act or the Norris-LaGuardia Act applicable
is not too clear from the opinion. 2'
18. In the past the cases have been brought under Section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act for breach of contract, but the remedy
urged upon the court has usually been the Federal Arbitration Act. See
International Union United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring
Co., 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948). Cf. Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod
Carriers, Local 210, 182 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1950), where the court refused to
stay proceedings but did grant damages. Only lately has it been urged that
Section 301 itself gives the power to compel specific performance or a stay
of proceedings. See note 26 infra.
19. 203 F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1953).
20. 113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953), 67 HARV. L. REv. 181.
21, 113 F. Supp. 137, 142 (D. Mass. 1953). Even if it is admitted that Sec-
tion 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act gives the federal courts
jurisdiction over arbitration disputes, there is still the problem of what sub-
stantive law is to be applied in order to determine the rights of the parties.
There are several possibilities: (1) Apply the common law and federal
statutes; (2) Section 301 gives the parties new substantive rights and/or the
federal courts are to develop their own common law of the subject; or (3) the
federal law is to control with respect to jurisdiction and the local law with
respect to the substantive rights of the parties. In the American Thread
case, the court did not decide this point, saying it was unnecessary as the
agreement to arbitrate was enforceable under any one of these theories.
19541
600 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [VOL. XIV
A somewhat contrary result was reached in International
-Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Local 142 v. Libby,
McNeill & Libby.2 2 Here the union sought a declaratory judg-
ment concerning an alleged breach of contract by the employer.
The district court reasoned that it had no jurisdiction to grant
the necessary supporting injunctive relief and consequently
could not hear the case. In answer to the contention that Section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act conferred such juris-
diction the court said: "[J]urisdiction is conferred on district
courts, irrespective of citizenship of the parties or the amount in
controversy, only in suits for damages arising from violation of
collective bargaining contracts .... ,,2" (Italics supplied.) In sup-
port of this position the court cited the Norris-LaGuardia Act's
surviving jurisdictional requirements, which forbid issuing of
injunctions by federal courts in labor disputes.24
The fourth and potentially most flexible method is to petition
the National Labor Relations Board to enforce the agreement to
arbitrate. The board has the power to issue cease and desist
orders to a party engaged in an unfair labor practice.25 While
refusal to arbitrate is not specifically mentioned among the unfair
labor practices, 26 there is the possibility of construing a refusal to
arbitrate pursuant to a contractual agreement as a refusal to
bargain within the meaning of Sections 8(a)5 or 8(b)3 of the
Labor Management Relations Act.27
In Textile Workers v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 626 (M.D. N.C. 1950), the
court held that Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act created
a new substantive right enforceable in federal courts. See also Cox, Griev-
ance Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 67 HARV. L. REV. 591, 600 et seq. (1954).
22. 115 F. Supp. 123 (D. Hawaii 1953).
23. Id. at 124.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1946). For a discussion of some of the difficulties that
might be encountered in future decisions of this type, see Katz & Jaffe,
Enforcing Labor Arbitration Clauses by Section 801, Taft-Hartley Act, 8 ARe.
J. 80 (1953). See also Cox, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 67
HARV. L. REV. 591, 602 (1954).
25. Labor Management Relations Act, § 10(a), 61 STAT. 146 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 160 (1946).
26. It has been suggested that the Labor Management Relations Act be
amended so as to expressly give the National Labor Relations Board power
in these cases by listing it as an unfair labor practice. "There are two
methods of enforcing arbitration agreements through federal statutes which
appear the most feasible .... The second method would be to add a section
to the National Labor Relations Act which would make it an unfair labor
practice for an employer . . . to ... refuse to comply with the terms of an
arbitration clause set forth in a collective bargaining agreement." Gregory
& Orlikoff, The Enforcement of Labor Agreements, 17 U. of CHi. L. REV. 233,
262 (1950).
27. Section 8(a)5 reads: "[It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer] to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of Section 9(a)." Section 8(b)3 applies
the same principle to unions.
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Section 10 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act states
that the power of the board to prevent unfair labor practices
"shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment that has
been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise."
Thus the board's power to compel arbitration in such a case
would be unaffected by the presence or absence of other remedies
mentioned previously. Section 203 (d) of the Labor Management
Relations Act encourages settlement by the parties themselves
in declaring that:
"Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is
hereby declared to be the desirable method for settlement
of grievance disputes arising over the application or inter-
pretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement."
This section, together with Section 8 (d), which provides that "the
duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such
contract shall terminate or modify such contract" would seem
to indicate that the contractual duty to arbitrate can be enforced.
Messrs. Cox and Dunlop, however, have pointed out that:
"During the term of a collective bargaining agreement an
offer to follow the contract grievance procedure satisfies any
duty to bargain collectively with respect to a matter to which
the contract grievance procedure may apply. A refusal either
to follow the contract procedure or to discuss the issue at
large is a violation of Sections 8 (a) (5) and 8 (b) (3).1"28
Since the employer has the option "either to follow the contract
procedure or to discuss the issue at large," it would follow that
the employer can escape the arbitration clause by bargaining
at large.29
Since the National Labor Relations Board has stated that it
will not police contracts,80 it would seem that the party who bar-
28. Cox & Dunlop, The Duty to Bargain Collectively During the Term of
an Existing Agreement, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (1950).
29. "When either an employer or a union charges the other with violating
Section 8(a) (5) by refusing to bargain about such a question [concerning
Interpretation or application of an existing contract], the Regional Director
should refuse to issue a complaint unless it appears that the respondent has
refused either to negotiate the question or to follow the contract procedure.
Thus, the NLRB would intervene only when (a) the contract contains no
applicable grievance procedure, or (b) the respondent refuses either to follow
an applicable procedure or to bargain about the question. Since the Board
does not undertake to enforce collective bargaining agreements, any remedial
order should also leave open both alternatives." Id. at 1108.
30. "We are of the opinion . .. that it will not effectuate the statutory
policy of 'encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining'
for the Board to assume the role of policing collective contracts between the
1954]
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gains over an issue will not be forced to arbitrate. \This position
could be supported by Section 8(d) of the Labor Management
Relations Act, providing that "such obligation [to bargain] does
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession." This argument can be met, however,
by arguing that the board is not forcing the party to reach an
agreement, but merely compelling him to do what he has agreed
to do. V
Indicative of the general attitude of the National Labor
Relations Board in the past is the treatment given to similar cases
that have come before it. In In re Bergen Point Iron Works
and Local 445, United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of
America (CIO),81 the employer and the union had a contract
containing arbitration as the last step in the grievance proce-
dure.82 The employer refused to check off dues, effected some
unilateral reductions in welders' rates, and refused to meet with
the union grievance committee as scheduled. The union filed a
grievance concerning these matters, but the employer refused
to process the grievance, claiming the contract was null and
void. The employer was found guilty of an unfair labor practice.
The board upheld a section of the trial examiner's report making
the following findings:
"Also relevant, as bearing on the question of whether
the respondent at the time was genuinely interested in com-
posing through collective bargaining its differences with the
Union ... [is] the respondent's refusal to arbitrate the dis-
pute concerning the continued effectiveness of its old con-
tract .... None of these circumstances constitutes a per se
violation of the Act .... They must be evaluated ... in con-
text with the respondent's entire course of conduct of which
they are part .... When so viewed, they provided, it is found,
persuasive evidence that the respondent . . .was actuated
more by a fixed intent to penalize and discredit the Union.
employers and labor organizations by attempting to decide whether disputes
as to the meaning and administration of such contracts constitute unfair
labor practices under the Act." Consolidated Aircraft Corp. and International
Ass'n of Machinists, Aircraft Lodge No. 1125, A.F.L., 47 N.L.R.B. 694, 706
(1943). But is it not even more detrimental to collective bargaining to tell
parties that although they have agreed to settle their differences in a certain
procedure, they will not be required to live up to that procedure?
31. 79 N.L.R.B. 1073 (1948).
32. "Shortly after the union was certified, the respondent met with It and
negotiated terms and conditions of a comprehensive bargaining agreement.
. . '. Mutual agreement was reached by the parties with respect to . . .the
submission to arbitration of all unadjusted disputes, with arbitration costs
payable by the respondent. . . ." 79 N.L.R.B. 1073, 1080 (1948).
[VOL. XlV
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S.. Such an attitude and approach are not consistent with
good faith bargaining. 3 3
The refusal to arbitrate was thus considered only an indication
of a lack of good faith bargaining. The tenor of the opinion seems
to indicate that had the employer agreed to bargain, even though
refusing to arbitrate, he would not have been guilty of an unfair
labor practice.
In re California Portland Cement Co. and United Cement,
Lime & Gypsum Workers International Union, Local No. 89
(AFL)3 4 presented a dispute over transfer of work by an employer
to another plant. The employer asked to have the grievance sub-
mitted in writing; the union did so, but at the same time filed a
charge with the National Labor Relations Board alleging that
failure to consult the union about the transfer was refusal to
bargain. The employer then refused to process the grievance,
maintaining that he was relieved of his duty to bargain since
the dispute was now before the National Labor Relations Board.
In holding the employer guilty of a refusal to bargain the board
stated:
"The Respondent contends that the refusal to bargain
on this issue should be deemed to be excused by the Union's
failure to exhaust its remedies under the contract grievance
procedure before filing the amended charge. However, the
Union did invoke the grievance procedure, in compliance
with Respondent's request, and it was the Respondent, not
the Union, that refused to process the grievance further."85
A possible inference from this decision is that the employer must
allow the union to exhaust its remedies under the contract in the
proper discharge of his duty to bargain. It is at least arguable
that the California Portland Cement case would apply to the
arbitration clause as well as to the bargaining and other phases
of the procedure. It is important to note, however, that the
employer not only refused to process the grievance, but also
refused to bargain over the dispute outside the grievance pro-
cedure. Here again, had the respondent agreed to bargain, ignor-
ing the grievance procedure, the result would probably have
been different.
Indicative of the attitude of state boards on this point is the
case of Purity Food Co. v. Connecticut State Board of Labor
33. 79 N.L.R.B. 1073, 1102-3 (1948).
34. 31 L.R.R.M. 1220 (1952).
35. Ibid.
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Relations,30 where the court upheld a Connecticut Labor Board
decision ruling that the employer was guilty of a refusal to
bargain. The contract contained a grievance procedure providing
for arbitration.37 In its decision the Connecticut Superior Court
stated: "Furthermore, the company refused to participate in
arbitration and mediation proceedings when the union submitted
the controversy to that board."3s Here again, as in the Bergen
case, the board interpreted the refusal to arbitrate as evidence
to show the employer's refusal to bargain.
The Wisconsin Labor Board has recently handed down a
decision that seems worthy of extended comment here. In Uphol-
sterers' International Union of North America, Local No. 352
(AFL) v. Dunphy Boat Corp.39 the union petitioned the board for
a cease and desist order alleging refusal to bargain on the part
of the employer on the ground that the employer had refused
to abide by his contractual agreement to arbitrate. The board
held that: (1) Executory contracts to arbitrate are unenforceable
in Wisconsin and conceded that the courts may not enforce such
an agreement, 40 but (2) the board may enforce such an agree-
ment under Section 111.10 of the Wisconsin Act.41 The particu-
lar section which the employer was held to have violated reads:
"(1) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
individually, or in concert with others:
"(f) To violate the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement .... 42
36. 28 L.R.R.M. 2094 (1951).
37. "Thereafter the company failed to negotiate with the union, which
submitted the controversies concerning the company's Violations of the agree-
ment to the state board of mediation and arbitration in accordance with the
contract, which provided for such procedure in the event the parties could
not amicably adjust controversies arising under it. The company refused to
participate in the arbitration proceedings .. " Id. at 2095.
38. Id. at 2097. Of. language used in In re Gray Line Bus Co. and Amal-
gamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach Employees of America
(AFL), 19 L.R.R.M. 1067 (1946).
39. 33 L.R.R.M. 1002 (1953).
40. See Local 1111 United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of
America v. Allen-Bradley Co., 259 Wis. 609, 49 N.W.2d 720 (1951). For a more
complete discussion of the Wisconsin position, see Note [1953] Wis. L.
REV. 739.
41. Wis. STAT. § 111.10 (1949). The Wisconsin board in a previous case
ordered the arbitration of future contract terms as agreed upon in the
contract. Madison Bus Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board and
Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Electric Ry. and Motor Coach Employees of
America, Local Div. No. 456, 25 L.R.R.M. 2398 (1949).
42. WIs. STAT. § 111.06(1)(f) (1949).'
[VOL. XIV
COMMENTS
The similarity between this provision and Section 8 (d) of
the Labor Management Relations Act is striking. Section 8 (d)
provides that "the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean
that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such
contract. . . ." It would seem, therefore, that the National Labor
Relations Board could come to the same conclusion as was
reached by the Wisconsin Board and find that a refusal to arbi-
trate, as agreed upon, is a refusal to bargain and consequently
an unfair labor practice.
Against this background of available precedent and possible
argument, the National Labor Relations Board recently con-
sidered the question of whether or not a refusal to arbitrate con-
stitutes a refusal to bargain. In the case of In re Textron Puerto
Rico (Tricot Division) and Textile Workers Union Local 24,877
(ILA-AFL) ' 3 the employer and the union had signed a collective
bargaining agreement containing a grievance procedure with
arbitration as the final step. A union member was discharged for
alleged forging of work records and the union sought to process
the discharge as a grievance. The employer refused to process
the grievance. The trial examiner came to the conclusion that
the employer had violated Section 8(a)5 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act. It would seem that the trial examiner based
his decision on the fact that the employer refused to consider the
grievance on its merits at all and not on the mere refusal to
arbitrate the question. The trial examiner found:
"Accordingly, the Respondent was required by the Act to
bargain with the Union by discussing with it the merits of
the grievance concerning Carrasquillo's discharge. This the
Respondent has refused, and continues to refuse to do in
violation of Section 8 (a) (5) and 8 (a) (1) of the Act .... As
noted, the violation in this case resulted from the Respon-
dent's denial of the Union's statutory, not contract, rights. ...
[I]t is not here found that the Respondent violated the Act
by refusing to arbitrate Carrasquillo's grievance, but that its
misinterpretation of the contract has impelled it to refuse to
consider the grievance on its merits at all, thereby violating
Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act." 4 4
The National Labor Relations Board reversed the trial examiner
and came to the following conclusions: (1) The record did not
show a violation of the statutory duty to bargain, and (2) the
43. 107 N.L.R.B. No. 142 (1953).
44. Id. at 6.
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most that could be said was that the employer refused to arbi-
trate the issue and that this fact alone did not constitue a viola-
tion of Section 8(a)5 of the Labor Management Relations Act."
In the great majority of cases in which the grievance pro-
cedure reaches the arbitration stage both parties fulfill their
agreement to arbitrate. It is possible, however, that the very
absence of an adequate sanction to enforce arbitration will cause
harm to the arbitration process. In states which have passed or
will pass specific statutes allowing the enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements in labor cases no real problem will arise. Assum-
ing the National Labor Relations Board follows the precedent set
in the Textron case, enforcement as an unfair labor practice
under Sections 8(a)5 or 8(b)3 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act seems not to be available as a method of enforcement.
Although a simple amendment of either the Labor Management
Relations Act or the Federal Arbitration Act could provide the
necessary remedy to enforce arbitration it is not likely that Con-
gress will pass such a statute in the near future. As was noted
above, Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act has
been used successfully in some jurisdictions to enforce the agree-
ment to arbitrate. Thus, in the absence of a state statute, Section
301 provides the method which is most likely to meet with success
in the immediate future.
Maynard E. Cush
Visitation Rights of the Parent
Without Custody
The Louisiana Civil Code provides that upon separation or
divorce the custody of a minor child of the marriage is given to
one of the parents.' No provision in the legislation recognizes a
45. "Thus, the record establishes, at the most, that the Respondent
refused to comply with the Union's request that the Respondent submit to
arbitration the dispute arising out of that discharge. Whether or not such
refusal constituted a breach of the collective bargaining agreement, it did not
in itself, constitute a violation of Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act.
Accordingly we shall dismiss the complaint." Id. at 2.
1. Art. 157, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870, as amended, La. Acts 1924, No. 74,
p. 114: "In all cases of separation and of divorce the children shall be placed
under the care of the party who shall have obtained the separation or divorce
unless the judge shall, for the greater advantage of the children, order that
[VOL. XIV
